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6. AIRWORTHINESS CONSIDERATIONS.
a. Certification Program. This advisory circular provides guidance for the
airworthiness approval of both "annunciation only and "annunciation with
guidance" airborne windshear warning systems as many of the system design
aspects, functions, and characteristics are common. In either case, the scope
of the applicant's program should be directed toward airworthiness approval
through the Type Certificate (TC) or Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) process.
In the case of systems with flight guidance which will ultimately be used on
aircraft in air carrier service, the applicant is encouraged to undertake a
certification program which will satisfy both the criteria contained herein, as
well as that contained in AC 120-41, Criteria for Operational Approval of
Airborne Windshear Alerting and Flight Guidance Systems. Many of the criteria
outlined below in paragraph 6(d)(2) can also be satisfied in finding compliance
with § 25.1301 of the FAR, if the certification program satisfies both
operational and airworthiness criteria. A statement will be placed in the
approved Airplane Flight Manual indicating compliance with AC 12U-41, thereby
providing for a more streamlined operational approval process for an air carrier
under Parts 121 or 135 of the FAR.
b. Certification Plan. A comprehensive certification plan should be
developed by the applicant. It should include how the applicant plans to comply
with the applicable regulations and should provide a listing of the
substantiating data and necessary tests. Also, a comprehensive system
description and an estimated time schedule should be included. A well developed
plan will be of significant value both to the applicant and the FAA.
c. System Criticality. Certain types of failure cases must be addressed in
consideration of the potential hazard they may induce during the course of
normal system operation. Advisory Circular 25.1309-1, System Design Analysis,
provides criteria to correlate the depth of analysis required with the type of
function the system performs (nonessential, essential, or critical). Also,
failure conditions which result From improper accomplishment or loss of function
are addressed. The criticality of certain system failure cases for windshear
warning and systems with escape guidance are outlined in paragraphs (I) and (2)
below. In the case of systems which provide escape guidance, there may be a
number of complex system integrations with existing airplane systems and
sensors; and the treatment of all the combinations possible is beyond the scope
of this AC. In this case, AC 25.1309-1 states that the flight test pilot
should: (I) determine the detectability of a failure condition, (2) determine
the required subsequent pilot actions, and (3) make a judgment if satisfactory
intervention can be expected of a properly trained crew. In addition, failure
of the windshear warning system should not degrade the integrity of other
essential or critical systems installed in the airplane. This includes common
shared sensors.
(I) Windshear Warning. The system should be designed so that false
warnings have a probability of occurrence on the order of 10-_ or less. This
includes the failure of the system to annunciate a windshear warning as a result
of a ]atent failure.
(2) Systems with Escape Guidance. In addition to the criteria of
paragraph (I) above, the following system failure cases should be improbable in
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accordance with AC 25.1309-I. (Consideration for out-of-production airplanes
with early versions of unmonitored flight director computers and mechanical
flight instruments is warranted, and those systems may have a probability of
failure on the order-of 10-3 or less.)
(i) Unannunciated failure of the system to provide the escape
guidance function when commanded. Removal of flight director command bars
constitutes adequate annunciation.
(ii) The display of escape guidance other tllan that evaluated and
approved in accordance with § 25.1301 of the FAR (see paragraph d, Intended
Function, below).
NOTE: The loss of windshear warning annunciation should not preclude or inhibit
the presentation of the escape guidance information, as long as the guidance
mode change annunciation remains valid and the annunciation is provided in a
clear and unambiguous manner.
(3) Software Based Systems. The software should be developed to a
minimum of level 2. An acceptable means for obtaining approval for the
development of the software based system is to follow the design methodology
contained in RTCA Document DO-I'/dA, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems
and Equipment Certification.
(4) Probability Analysis. The applicant should provide a quantitative
probability analysis to support an engineering evaluation of the system failure
cases listed above. For this purpose, an exposure time of 0.i hour has been
found acceptable by the FAA in the past. This criteria assumes that internal
system tests verify proper system status immediately prior to the system being
enabled. The probabiliy of the airplane encountering a severe windshear should
be I (one) and the c_aputed probabilities of occurrence should be expressed in
failures per flight hour.
d. Intended Function. The major emphasis for showing compliance with
§ 25.13UI is centered around the aspects of establishing a windshear warning
threshold that considers remaining airplane performance. For systems that
include escape guidance provisions, a subjective evaluation of airplane
performance is made to determine that the algorithms manage the available energy
in such a manner as to enhance flight path control beyond that which would be
normally expected without the use of the system. In addition, applicable system
integration aspects are'evaluated in order to determine that there are no
adverse functional effects with the existing airplane systems and sensors that
are integrated to the windshear warning system.
(I) Airborne Warnin_ System. The applicant must demonstrate by analysis
and simulation that the system warning threshold is appropriate for a given
airplane/engine combination. Once this aspect has been demonstrated and
approved by the FAA for a given windshear warning system, it need not be
repeated for other airplane models if the applicant can show that the technology
employed for this purpose is suitable. If applicable, system integration and
the use of external airplane sensors on the same or new model types must be
taken into account.
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number of severe windshear encounters and conducted studies to determine the
criticality of flight variables like airspeed, altitude, thrust-to-weight ratio,
etc. This effort has resulted in the identification of a number of items that
should be considered when establishing alert threshold, flight procedures, and
training requirements.
(2) Warnin 9 Only System. The procedure added to the AFMS should contain
the following basic elements:
(i) Aggressively apply maximum rated thrust, disengaging
autothrottle if necessary.
(ii) Rotate smoothly at a normal rate to the go-around/takeoff pitch
attitude and allow the airspeed to decrease, if necessary.
(iii) If the airplane is descending, increase pitch attitude
smoothly and in small increments, bleeding airspeed as necessary to stop the
descent.
(iv) Use stall warning onset as the upper limit of pitch attitude.
(v) Engine overboost should be avoided unless the airplane
continues to descend and airplane safety is in doubt. When airplane safety has
been assured, adjust thrust to maintain engine parameters within approved
limits.
NOTE: Overboosting engines while at angles of attack near airplane stall
warning may cause engine stall, surge, or flameout.
(vi) Do not retract flaps or landing gear until safe climb-out is
assured.
(3) Warnin 9 with Escape Guidance System. In addition to providing the
information and procedures peculiar to the new system, a statement should be
made in the AFMS that in all cases of windshear warning, the escape guidance
should be followed until the maneuver has been safely completed.
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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
BOB IRELAND (United Airlines) - Ray, I've got one quick
question for you. Could you bring up page 13 again that you had
on the board before? There seems to have been an effort made on
this page, and I applaud it, to recommend a manual recovery
technique which is similar to that which comes out in the FAA
training aid. The question I'm left with here is "(2) (ii)":
"Rotates smoothly at normal rate to the normal go around take off
pitch attitude." As you are well aware, the training aid does
specify other target pitch attitudes, they are just fixed target
pitch attitudes regardless of your gross weight or whatever else
might affect takeoff pitch attitude. And I'm wondering why you
chose to put something else there, when there is a warning on
this airplane, as opposed to when there is not a warning? The
FAA recommends just a fixed pitch attitude.
RAY STOER (FAA) - Because Bob, we are not trying to write
the flight manual or get down to the details of a particular
airplane type. What we are trying to do is say, "you should
consider these basic elements." As we went through this with
Herb and some of his people in our judgement, we felt that this
was not inconsistent with the training aid. If you are trying to
identify, perhaps, a specific airplane type then you might
say--well that doesn't fit as well. Our intention here was to
make some generic considerations which hopefully will bring to
the attention of somebody writing the flight manual, the kinds of
things that we would like to have considered. That was our
intent.
BOB IRELAND (United Airlines) - I understand the intent.
Would it, perhaps, be better to have said: "rotate to an
appropriately determined pitch attitude," rather than a specific
situation like that?
RAY STOER (FAA) - It may have been a better thing to do Bob.
BOB IRELAND (United Airlines) - Okay, I just wanted to
understand your intent. I appreciate that.
RAY STOER (FAA) - Even with the change we made here
[pointing to viewgraph] and I should point this out, that when we
got into the overboost concern here and we made this new number 5
here [pointing to viewgraph], we coordinated this immediately
with Herb, in fact we had a national telecom within the FAA on
this power plant subject. We had Herb on because we wanted to be
sure that whatever we did come up with was not going to be
inconsistent with the wind shear training document. Or at least,
if we were going to be inconsistent we wanted to understand that,
right up front. That doesn't mean that if we don't find
something is wrong we can't say it because we're inconsistent,
but we wanted to identify that immediately. In our judgement, we
are, from a generic standpoint, consistent with the wind shear
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training aid.
BOB IRELAND (United Airlines) - That's great. Just a
comment on the engine section right there. I think that Ralph
and I could tell you that many, many days and hours were expended
in talking about engines in the training document as well. It
was a very very difficult subject and I really like what you put
there. I think it is a very good way to go.
RAY STOER (FAA) - Thank you. Our very first certification
with the wind shear system was about 7 or 8 years ago and I had
the pleasure of being on that with the United Airlines at the San
Francisco Engineering Base on a 747. It was a "one-only"
installation. It modified an existing Safe Flight SCAT (Speed
Control and Autothrottle) system in the pitch axis computer to
accommodate the wind shear escape guidance algorithms. United
took the leadership in this field at that time when we hardly
knew how to spell wind shear. And Safe Flight had so much
patience with us in sitting down and almost training us to what
they had. Again it relates back to the aspect that we have no
resources but people. We don't have any facilities to go out and
research things. We have to develop criteria concurrent with an
existing program and depend upon the manufacturer of that
equipment to teach and train us what he has. Our wind shear AC
(advisory circular) over the past 4 years--formally when we had a
team--and going back 7 and 8 years, has been a dynamic document.
It started as a one-page of what we think we ought to be doing
and has become a living document. And the reason that we are
going ahead and printing it now--at last--is because we have a
requirement within the government that if we have a rule-making
project in process we have to have a means of complying.
DAN LABRIOLA (Tech AirServices) - For those of us on the
training side - this Js _eally a good point about the engine
overboost and it seems it has really been a tough one because, we
started out saying that you should never overboost the engine and
you know max EPR's is what it was and we've been coming about on
that. But if we are going to start differentiating airplanes;
are you, or is someone, going to solicit and publish those
aircraft for which we can't recommend pushing the throttle to the
firewall.
RAY STOER (FAA) - Dan, I don't know the answer to that. Our
power plant group have an idea, but they don't specifically know
how many of the manufacturers and on what model types. The
individual manufacturers have independently looked at this region
cutside the envelope. And we never see that on the certification
program. Manufacturers don't like to show us anything they don't
need to. And that's okay, that is a defense mechanism on their
part and that's acceptable. They show us the operation of the
airplane Jn the envelope they seek to have approved. We have no
data, and many times we have no knowledge of how far the airplane
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is taken out of the envelope and explored by the manufacturer.
We know that goes on and it's okay, but we don't have data or
knowledge of just what that is. I think what we hope is that
this kind of a "hey caution fellows, let's take a look at this,"
is going to stimulate the equipment manufacturers' interest in
contacting the manufacturer and perhaps on getting some data from
the manufacturer on this. This may also stimulate new model
types that are being certified into, perhaps, taking a look at
this region now that it is identified, that we will be operating
in this region more often because of the wind shear guidance
algorithms.
DAN LABRIOLA (Tech AirServices) - I would suggest to you
that if the FAA doesn't solicit this kind of information it might
be a little tough for any of the rest of us to find that out.
RAY STOER (FAA) - I can agree with that Dan, and that is a
good thought. We didn't want to hold this [advisory circular]
up, and we tried to work a way out that we could put something in
here that perhaps was defendable (and we think it is defendable
outside this document). But we really didn't have the time to do
that. And what I would like to take an action item to you, if I
may, is discussing this with the manager of our power plant
section to see, in more detail, if there could be some interest
generated within the FAA to look into this region outside the
envelope and how we can control that. If we say we have an
approved envelope, do we have the right to ask the manufacturer
to show us data? I don't know that, but I think we need to
explore that a little bit. It is a good point.
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